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INTRODUCTION
There cannot be any doubt that the rule of law is one of the
most elementary and important features of the European Union
and the process of European integration as a whole. Without
denying the nature of the integration as a genuinely political
process, it is quite obvious that the rule of law is a truly
fundamental factor for the supranational European Union
which appears in legal texts as in legal practice as a true
cornerstone of the entire construction. The most prominent
placing of the rule of law in article 2 of the Treaty on European
Union (“TEU”) amongst the values, on which the European
Union is founded, might constitute the formal basis of the truly
essential nature of the rule of law for the establishment of the
European Union. The well-known reports of the Commission on
the rule of law in accession countries might be another symbolic
element of general political visibility in this respect.1
The particular significance of the rule of law for the
European Union is explained, better than in any source of legal
or judicial nature, in the speech that Walter Hallstein gave in
March 1962 at the University of Padua on the European
Economic Community as a Community of law, in which he
stated:
This Community was not created by military power or
political pressure, but owes its existence to a constitutive
legal act. It also lives in accordance with fixed rules of law
and its institutions are subject to judicial review. In place of
power and its manipulation, the balance of powers, the
1. See Commission of the European Communities, Communication From the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Enlargement Strategy
and Main Challenges 2013–2014, COM(2013) 700 Final (Oct. 2013), 6–8; see also, e.g.,
Commission of the European Communities, Communication From the Commission to
the European Parliament and the Council on Albania 2013 Progress Report,
SWD(2013) 414 Final, 5–10; Commission of the European Communities,
Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
on Serbia 2013 Progress Report, SWD(2013) 412 Final, 6–10; Commission of the
European Communities, Communication From the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council on Turkey 2013 Progress Report, SWD(2013) 417 Final, 5–
13.

2014]

THE RECENT JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECJ

1313

striving for hegemony and the play of alliances we have for
the first time the rule of law. The European Economic
Community is a community of law . . . , because it serves to
realize the idea of law.2

On the basis of this historical perspective, he reached the
conclusion which until today appears to be a most exquisite
portrayal of the nature of the treaties:
The founding treaty, which may not be terminated, forms a
kind of a Constitution for the Community which contains
rules on the establishment, composition, tasks, competences
and interaction of the institutions of the Community as well
as their relations with the Member States and the
Community citizens . . . . But Community law not only
grants powers to the Commission and the Council; at the
same time, it provides for the restriction and limitation of
these powers. The observance of these limits is ensured by
the judicial review, which is entrusted to the European
Court of Justice. The Court reviews the legality of acts of the
Council and the Commission and provides legal protection
in the field of Community law not only for Member States
but also for Community citizens.3

But, as it is the case with other fundamental constitutional
principles which have soon found general recognition, the real
challenge with which the rule of law is confronted in practice is
not a lack of acceptance or a sentiment of hidden regret. It is
rather the seemingly self-evident respect of the rule of law in
western democracies, which goes somehow strangely along with
the feeling that one does not need to be engaged for a legal
principle which is as obvious as the rule of law and therefore
does not require our principal attentiveness. Of course, nothing
is more profoundly wrong and dangerous than this kind of
reasoning, which is in full contrast with the general experience
which the judiciary has made throughout the western world.
Whether you take the practice of the US Supreme Court or of
the German Constitutional Court on the national level or of the
European Court of Human Rights or of the European Court of
2. See WALTER HALLSTEIN, Die EWG—Eine Rechtsgemeinschaft. Rede anlässlich der
Ehrenpromotion (Universität Padua, 12. März 1962), in EUROPÄISCHE REDEN 341, 343–44
(1979) (translation provided by author).
3. Id. at 344.
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Justice (“ECJ”) on the supranational level, the experience is
essentially identical in the sense that the democratic process
does not offer sufficient and sufficiently effective guarantees
against an abuse of power. If the king was said to do no wrong,
governments and legislators in democratic systems certainly can
do wrong and, based upon our experience, will do so. This is
why it is and will remain a continued task of the judiciary to
ensure the respect of the rule of law. In the European Union,
this is in principle no different than in its Member States, but it
is of course subject to a significant number of specific
considerations in the respective contexts in which the scrutiny of
the ECJ intervenes.
I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECJ
ON THE RULE OF LAW
Though it took the ECJ until 1986 to formally adhere to the
words of Walter Hallstein that the European Union is by its
nature a community of law,4 the oeuvre of the Court is, since the
very beginnings, closely linked to the development of principles
which form an integral part of the rule of law as it is recognized
throughout the national legal orders of its Member States.
A. Foundations in the Early Jurisprudence of the Court
Despite the specific European context, in which the rule of
law is placed hereby explaining the particular importance of the
other values proclaimed in article 2 TEU, such as human
dignity, freedom, and equality, as well as non-discrimination and
human rights in general, the Court’s jurisprudence on elements
of the rule of law originated from a rather traditional
perspective concerning the principles of legality, legal certainty,
confidence in the stability of a legal situation, and
proportionality.5
4. See Les Verts v. Parliament, Case C-294/83, [1986] E.C.R. I-1357, ¶ 23.
5. The leading cases of the early jurisprudence of the Court in this field have
been, Algera and others v. Common Assembly, Joined Cases 7/56 & 3–7/57, [1957]
E.C.R. 41, 55 (stating the principle of legality and principle of legal certainty);
S.N.U.P.A.T. v. High Auth., Joined Cases C-42/59 & 49/59, [1961] E.C.R. 55, 87
(stating the principle of legal certainty); Alvis v. Council, Case C-32/62, [1963] E.C.R.
49, 55 (stating the right to be heard); Klomp v. Inspectie der Belastingen, Case C23/68, [1969] E.C.R. 44, ¶ 13 (stating the confidence in the stability of a legal
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As it already became apparent in the equally famous and
fundamental Algera judgment, in which a comparative study had
shown that the principle of non-revocability of administrative
measures giving rise to individual rights is a legal principle
generally acknowledged in the legal orders of all Member States,
it would amount to a denial of justice, if the Court would have
based its judgment on the absence of an explicit rule in the
secondary law of the Union without having recourse to the
general principles of Union law as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States.6 But,
since the specific conditions for the application of such general
principles vary from one national legal order to another, the
recognition of general principles of Union law derived from the
common constitutional traditions always entails a creative
element and produces a harmonizing effect which goes beyond
the democratic legitimacy offered by the secondary legislation of
the Union.7 Being a paramount example of judge made law in
the European Union, the evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence
in this field is characterized by a cautious step-by-step approach
and a particular self-restraint.8 Nonetheless, over the past fiftyseven years since the Algera judgment, the Court has recognized
a wide range of principles which form an integral part of the
rule of law. The most prominent examples are substantive rules
derived from the principle of legality,9 the principle of legal
situation); Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide
und Futtermittel, Case C-11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1126, ¶ 12 (proportionality); H.
Ferwerda v. Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees, Case C-265/78, [1980] E.C.R. 618, ¶ 17
(stating the principle of legal certainty); Merkur Fleisch-Import v. Hauptzollamt
Hamburg-Ericus, Case C-147/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1389, ¶ 12 (stating proportionality);
Denkavit Nederland v. Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten, Case C-15/83,
[1984] E.C.R. 2172, ¶ 25 (stating proportionality).
6. See Algera and others, [1957] E.C.R. 41, 55.
7. See THOMAS VON DANWITZ, EUROPÄISCHES VERWALTUNGSRECHT, ENZYKLOPÄDIE
DER RECHTS—UND STAATSWISSENSCHAFT 210–14 (2008).
8. For cases regarding to the confidentiality of written communications between
lawyers and clients, see, for example, AM & S v. Commission, Case C-155/79, [1982]
E.C.R. 1577, ¶¶ 18–21; Akzo Nobel Chems. and Akcros Chems. v. Commission, Case C550/07 P, [2010] E.C.R. I-8301, ¶¶ 40–43, 69–70.
9. See Algera and others,, [1957] E.C.R. 41, 55; S.N.U.P.A.T.,, [1961] E.C.R. 55, 86;
De Compte v. Parliament, Case C-90/95 P, [1997] E.C.R. I-2011, ¶ 35; Conserve Italia v.
Commission, Case C-500/99 P, [2002] E.C.R. I-905, ¶ 90. See also the case law relating
to the principle of the legality of criminal offences and penalties, X, Case C-60/02,
[2004] E.C.R. I-665, ¶ 63; Advocaten voor de Wereld v. Leden van de Ministerraad,
Case C-303/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-3672, ¶¶ 49–50.
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certainty,10 the principle of confidence in the stability of a legal
situation,11 and, in particular, the principle of proportionality.12
Furthermore, the Court has recognized a significant number of
procedural guarantees as an embodiment of the rule of law such
as the right to be heard13 and the right of defence,14 the right of
access to the file,15 and the obligation to a proper motivation of
legal acts.16
10. See Administration des douanes v Société anonyme Gondrand Frères and
Société anonyme Garancini (Gondrand and Garancini), Case C-169/80, [1981] E.C.R.
1931, ¶ 15; Gebroeders van Es Douane Agenten v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en
Accijnzen, Case C-143/93, [1996] E.C.R. I-459, ¶ 27; Belgium v. Commission, C110/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-2829, ¶ 30; Akzo Nobel Chems. and Akcros Chems., [2010] E.C.R. I8301, ¶ 100 and the case law cited therein.
11. See Algera and others, [1957] E.C.R. 41, 55; S.N.U.P.A.T., [1961] E.C.R. 55, 87;
Lemmerz Werke v. High Auth., Case C-111/63, [1965] E.C.R. 678, 691; Klomp, [1969]
E.C.R. 44, ¶ 13. For the more recent case law, see, for example, Marks & Spencer, Case
C 62/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-6348, ¶¶ 44–45; Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde and
Bundeskartellanwalt v Schenker & Co. AG and Others, Case C 681/11, [2013] E.C.R. I0000, ¶ 41; Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group Litigation v. v
Commissioners of Inland Revenue and Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and
Customs, Case C 362/12, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 44–45.
12. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide
und Futtermittel, Case C-11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1126, ¶ 12; Merkur Fleisch-Import v.
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Ericus, Case C-147/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1389, ¶. 12; Denkavit
Nederland v. Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten, Case C-15/83, [1984]
E.C.R. 2172, ¶ 25; Schräder v. Hauptzollamt Gronau, Case C-265/87, [1989] E.C.R.
2237, ¶ 2. For the more recent case law, see, for example, Afton Chemical v. Secretary
of State for Transport, Case C 343/09, [2010] E.C.R. I 7027, ¶ 45; Nelson and Others
v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG & TUI Travel plc and Others v. Civil Aviation Auth., Joined
Cases 581/10 & 629/10, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 71; Sky Österreich v. Österreichischer
Rundfunk, Case C 283/11, [2013] E.C.R. I-____, ¶ 50.
13. Alvis v Council of the EEC, Case 32/62, [1963] E.C.R. 49, 55; Commission v.
Lisrestal and others, Case C-32/95 P, [1996] E.C.R. I-5387, ¶ 21; Mediocurso v.
Commission, Case C-462/98 P, [2000] E.C.R. I-7196, ¶ 36; Sopropé—Organizações de
Calçado Lda. v. Fazenda Pública, Case C-349/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-10369, ¶¶ 36–37;
France v. People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, Case C-27/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-____, ¶¶
65–66; G. and R v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, Case C-383/13 PPU,
[2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 32 and the case law cited therein.
14. See AM & S v. Commission, Case C-155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1577, ¶ 18; Orkem v.
Commission, Case C-374/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3343, ¶ 32; Akzo Nobel Chems. and Akcros
Chems., [2010] E.C.R. I-8301, ¶ 92 and the case law cited therein.
15. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, Case C-85/76, [1979] E.C.R. 464, ¶¶ 9,
11; Hercules Chemicals v. Commission, Case C-51/92 P, [1999] E.C.R. I-4250, ¶ 75;
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v. Commission, Joined Cases 238, 244, 245,
247, 250–52, 254/99 P, [2002] E.C.R. I-8618, ¶¶ 315–16; Aalborg Portland and others
v. Commission, Case C-204/00 P, [2004] E.C.R. I-403, ¶ 68; Knauf Gips KG v.
Commission, Case C-407/08 P, [2010] E.C.R. I-6375, ¶ 22.
16. See Portugal v. Commission, Case C-42/01, [2004] E.C.R. I-6102, ¶ 66;
Unicredito Italiano v. Agenzia delle Entrate, Ufficio Genova 1, Case C-148/04, [2005]
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B. The Increasing Importance of Comparative Considerations in Legal
Reasoning
Given the particular importance of the role which the
Court has attributed to comparative considerations in the
evolution of general principles of Union law, it appears
regrettable from an outside perspective that the methodology
which the Court applies is not made fully transparent.17 The
rather short references which are contained in the Court’s
judgments18 indeed only constitute the “tip of the iceberg”19 and
are based on extensive considerations contained in the
conclusions of the Advocate General20 and on preliminary
research done by the internal service of the Court.21 This lack of
full methodological transparency, which has somehow been
compensated for by a particularly intense treatment of the
E.C.R. I-11169, ¶ 99; Spain v. Council, Case C-310/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-7318, ¶ 57;
Interporc v. Commission, Case C-41/00 P, [2003] E.C.R. I-2156, ¶ 55; Elf Aquitaine v.
Commission, Case C-521/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 14; Confédération suisse v.
Commission, Case C-547/10 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 67.
17. SeePauliine Koskelo, Report of P. Koskelo, President of the Supreme Court of Finland,
in ACTES DU COLLOQUE POUR LE CINQUANTIÈME ANNIVERSAIRE DES TRAITÉS DE ROME 24
(2007),
available
at
http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/actes-du-colloque-pour-lecinquanti-me-anniversaire-des-trait-s-de-rome-pbQD7707253/.
18. See LTU v. Eurocontrol, Case C-29/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1541, ¶ 5; Kampffmeyer
and others v. Commission and Council, Joined Cases C-56–60/74, [1976] E.C.R. 712, ¶
6; Hoechst v. Commission, Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2919, ¶ 17;
Gerhard Köbler v. Republik Österreich, Case C-224/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-10290, ¶ 48
(principle of res judicata and independence of the judiciary); ThyssenKrupp Nirosta
GmbH v. Commission, Case C-352/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-2359, ¶ 123 (principle of res
judicata); Omega, Case C-36/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-9641, ¶¶ 33, 35 (human dignity). In
relation to the confidentiality of written communications between lawyers and clients,
the Court considered it appropriate to found its judgment on a more detailed analysis
of the legal situation in the Member States, see AM & S, [1982] E.C.R. p. I-1577, ¶¶
18–21; Akzo Nobel Chems. and Akcros Chems., [2010] E.C.R. I-8301, ¶¶ 40–43, 69–76.
19. See Pierre Pescatore, Le recours dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des
Communautés Européennes a des normes déduites de la comparaison des droits des États
membres, 35 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARÉ [R.I.D.C] 337, 358 (1980) (Fr.).
20. See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Hoechst v. Commission, Joined
Cases 46/87 & 227/88, [1989] E.C.R. I-2875, ¶¶ 48–126; Opinion of Advocate General
Léger, Köbler v. Austria Case C-224/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-10243, ¶¶ 91, 96; Opinion of
Advocate General Stix-Hackl, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v
Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, Case C-36/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-9611, ¶¶
82–84; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Akzo Nobel Chems. and Akcros Chems.,
[2010] E.C.R. I-8301, ¶¶ 47, 89–91, 101–04.
21. RÜDIGER STOTZ, Die Rolle des Gerichtshofs bei der Integration, in Rengeling/von
Borries (Hrsg.), in AKTUELLE ENTWICKLUNGEN IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 21,
42 n.118.
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comparative method in academic writing of different
generations of judges of the Court,22 is certainly due to the
discretion which the Court has to exercise in the evolution and
recognition of general principles of Union law and in particular
when it comes to determine the precise contours of such a
principle. In order to protect the authority of the Court’s
judgments, it becomes more and more vital to base judicial
decision-making on comparative insights. Since the enlargement
of the European Union goes along with an increase of legal
orders which have to be taken into consideration when it comes
to the recognition of general principles of EU law, the
importance of comparative analysis is equally enhanced and the
discretion which the Court has to exercise in this respect
certainly becomes more delicate.
But, the increasing importance of comparative
considerations in legal reasoning in EU law is, in particular,
intensified by an evolution which has been initiated by national
judiciaries and is enshrined in the concept of what is called
“multilevel cooperation of courts” or Gerichtsverbund in the
European Union.23 On the basis of what Chief Justice Murray
from Ireland described as a growing judicial cosmopolitanism,24
this methodology of interpretation has expanded significantly in
recent years. Today, judges pay increasing attention to
comparative law arguments. While the famous controversy
22. HANS KUTSCHER, THESEN ZU DEN METHODEN DER AUSLEGUNG DES
GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHTS AUS DER SICHT EINES RICHTERS 23 (1976)(abbreviated language
of material); Pierre Pescatore, Le recours dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des
Communautés Européennes a des normes déduites de la comparaison des droits des États
membres, 35 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARÉ [R.I.D.C] 337 (1980) (Fr.);
Josse Mertens de Wilmars, Le droit comparé dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des
Communautées européennes, JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 37 (1991) (Fr.) (abbreviated
language of material); Yves Calmot, Réflexions sur le recours au droit comparé par la Cour de
justice des Communautés européennes, RÉVUE FRANÇAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 258
(1990)(Fr.) (abbreviated language of material).
23. See Andreas Voßkuhle, President, Bundesverfassungsgericht, Sir Thomas More
Lecture at the Honourable Society of Lincoln’s Inn: European Integration and the
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Oct. 31, 2013) [hereinafter Voßkuhle, European
Integration], available at http://www.london.diplo.de/contentblob/4026032/Daten/
3646135/Vosskuhle.pdf.
24. JOHN L. MURRAY, Methods of Interpretation Comparative Law Method, in ACTES
DU COLLOQUE POUR LE CINQUANTIEME ANNIVERSAIRE DES TRAITES DE ROME 45, 48
(Euorpean Court of Justice eds., 2007), available at http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/
actes-du-colloque-pour-le-cinquanti-me-anniversaire-des-trait-s-de-rome-pbQD7707253/.
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between Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia from the US
Supreme Court concerning the relevance of foreign law for the
interpretation of the US Constitution has shown the conceptual
difference in paradigmatic clarity,25 the interpretation rule
enshrined in article 39 of the South African Constitution of
1996, according to which the interpretation of fundamental
rights has to respect international law and has to take account of
foreign law, is certainly an instructive example of this recent
evolution.26 But, of course, it is of much greater practical
importance to see that the ECJ has, by way of preliminary
references, already been confronted with differences in the
constitutional conceptions of different Member States and, on
that basis, been asked to take those considerations into account
when interpreting a fundamental right granted by the Charter
of Fundamental Rights.27
The interpretation of fundamental rights offers a
particularly striking example for the growing need of
comparative analysis and the search for an interpretation which
takes account of the meaning given to an equivalent right. This
consideration has to be highlighted in the European context of
the protection of fundamental rights, which genuinely takes
place in a multilayered system. On the national level,
fundamental rights are protected by national constitutions and,
in quite a number of states, by constitutions of federated
entities. On the European level, fundamental rights of EU
25. See the grounds of the judgment written by Justice Kennedy for the majority
in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576–77 (2003) with reference to the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights. In addition, see the dissenting opinion by Scalia, in
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69 (1988) and in Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 608 (2005). In this regard, see also Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad when
Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353 (2004); Richard
A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31,
85–90 (2005); William H. Pryor Jr., Foreign and International Law Sources in Domestic
Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173 (2006); Ganesh Sitaraman,
The Use and Abuse of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 32 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
653 (2009); Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: the U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign
Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 637 (2007); DONALD W. JACKSON, GLOBALIZING JUSTICE:
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND THE CROSS-BORDER MIGRATION
OF LEGAL NORMS 7 (Michael C. Tolley & Mary L. Volcansek eds., 2010).
26. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, art. 39.
27. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. C 364/1
[hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights]. See, e.g., Germany v. Y and Z, Joined
Cases C-71/11 & C-99/11, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 42, 56–72.
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citizens are protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, by
general principles of EU law, and by the fundamental rights
enshrined in the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Only for the latter
convention, it is generally accepted that the human rights
protected therein lay down minimal standards.28 But, beyond
the specific function of the Convention, as a matter of principle,
it would be difficult for citizens to accept that the protection
offered by fundamental rights with respect to EU institutions or
acts undertaken by Member States to implement Union law
would offer a lower level of protection than the one ensured on
the national level against “purely” national acts of public
authority. Differences in the level of protection would finally
lead to a detrimental forum shopping in search of the most
advantageous human rights protection29 and provoke major
difficulties in the delimitation of the respective jurisdictional
competences.30
But, beyond those general considerations which imply an
enhanced degree of awareness for comparative law
considerations in the protection of fundamental rights, the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union goes
even a step further in making such considerations mandatory. It
is quite striking to see that article 52 of the Charter, specifically
in paragraphs 3, 4, and 6, contains provisions which are much
more elaborate and precise than the rather general rule
contained in article 39 of the South African Constitution. In
addition, it seems that those provisions form a set of
complementary requirements which, as such, might cause
difficulties and even create contradictions. Article 52, paragraph
28. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 53, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (“Nothing in this
Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights
and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High
Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a party.”).
29. See Kamberaj v. L’Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di
Bolzano and Others, Case C-571/10, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 62; Åklagaren v. Åkerberg
Fransson, Case C-617/10, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 44.
30. See
Åkerberg
Fransson,
[2013]
E.C.R.
I____,
¶¶
17–27;
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Apr. 24, 2013, 1
BvR 1215/07, NJW-RECHTSPRECHUNGS- REPORT, ZIVILRECHT [NJW] 2013, 1499, 1501
(Ger.), available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20130424_1bvr121
507.html; Voßkuhle, European Integration, supra note 23.
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3, states that for the Charter rights, which correspond to rights
guaranteed by the Convention, the meaning and scope of those
rights shall be the same as those laid down in the Convention. It
is clarified that this provision does not prevent Union law to
provide a more extensive protection. In the same line of
reasoning but less imperative, article 52, paragraph 4, foresees
that fundamental rights which are recognized by the Charter as
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States, shall be interpreted in harmony with those
traditions. Finally, article 52, paragraph 6, holds that full
account shall be taken to national laws and practices where the
articles of the Charter contain a specific reference to national
laws and practices.
Doubtlessly, those requirements have been included in the
Charter in order to achieve a well-balanced and generally
accepted standard of protection in the field of fundamental
rights which should not differ too significantly from the
traditions of the Member States. But, since those are far from
being identical, the application of these interpretationguidelines is even more accentuated by the explanations to the
Charter which have been drafted in order to give guidance in
the interpretation of the Charter and which shall, according to
article 52, paragraph 7, be given due regard by the courts of the
Union and of the Member States. For the time being, it is not
yet foreseeable how the Court will face those different directives
of interpretation which might, notably in a situation in which
fundamental rights apply on the basis of multilateral relations,
avoid incoherent results and, in particular, an open conflict
between diverging requirements. It is even less predictable as to
whether the ECJ will be able to apply those guidelines as a set of
strict limitations to its judicial autonomy in the interpretation of
the Charter rights or whether the need for an autonomous
interpretation of the fundamental rights as it follows from the
structure and the objectives of the Union will prevail.31

31. See Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für
Getreide und Futtermittel, Case C-11/70, [1970] E.C.R. I-1126, ¶4.
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II. RECENT JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECJ ON THE RULE OF
LAW
It should not be too much of a surprise that the recent
jurisprudence of the ECJ on the rule of law was not triggered by
the deviant behavior of Member States which is, as we will see
later on, undoubtedly, in need of a reinforcement of the rule of
law. The recent jurisprudence of the Court on the rule of law
was rather provoked by the institutions of the European Union
and, more generally, by what has become famous as the “war on
terror.” It was the mechanism of the so-called smart sanctions
which the Security Council of the United Nations used inter alia
against private individuals and associations, which has given rise
to the question how the right of defense would and could be
ensured in a situation in which the European Union was
charged to implement the sanctions binding under the UN
Charter. Already in 2008, in the landmark decision in the joined
case Kadi and Al Barakaat,32 the Court recognized the necessity
32. See Kadi and Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council and Commission, Joined
Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, [2008] E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 281. The legal comments
relating to this judgment are abundant, see, e.g., MARKUS KOTZUR, Kooperativer
Grundrechtsschutz in der Völkergemeinschaft, in EUROPÄISCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFT
673 (2008) (Ger.); PAUL CASSIA & FRANCIS DONNAT, Terrorisme International et Droits
Fondamentaux: Les Leçons du Droit Communautaire, in REVUE FRANÇAISE DE DROIT
ADMINISTRATIF 1204 (2008) (Fr.); ROBERT KOLB, Le Contrôle de Résolutions
Contraignantes du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies Sous ’L’angle du Respect du Jus
Cogens, in REVUE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET EUROPÉEN 401 (2008) (Fr.);
JÖRN AXEL KÄMMERER, Das Urteil des Europäischen Gerichtshofes im Fall “Kadi”“: Ein
Triumph der Rechtsstaatlichkeit?, in EUROPARECHT 114 (2009) (Ger.); JEAN PAUL JACQUÉ,
Primauté du Droit International versus Protection des Droits Fondamentaux, in REVUE
TRIMESTRIEL DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 161 (2009) (Fr.); KIRSTEN SCHMALENBACH, Bedingt
Kooperationsbereit: Der Kontrollanspruch des EuGH bei Gezielten Sanktionen der Vereinten
Nationen, in JURSITENZEITUNG 3 (2009) (Ger.); STEFAN GRILLER, Die Bindung der
Europäischen Union an das Recht der Vereinten Nationen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der
Rechtswirkungen von Beschlüssen des Sicherheitsrates im Unionsrecht, in ZEITSCHRIFT
EUROPARECHT 103 (2012) (abbreviated language of material); Guy Harpaz, Judicial
Review by the European Court of Justice of UN ‘Smart Sanctions’ Against Terror in the Kadi
Dispute, 14 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 65 (2009); Grainne De Búrca, The European Court of
Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 44 (2010); Ana
Maria Salinas DeFrias, COUNTER-TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 83
(Katja Samuel & Nigel White eds., 2012); Christian Tomuschat, The Kadi Case: What
Relationship is there between the Universal Legal Order under the Auspices of the United Nations
and the EU Legal Order?, 28 Y.B. OF EURO. L. 654 (2009); Federico Fabbrini, The Role of
the Judiciary in Times of Emergency: Judicial Review of Counter-Terrorism Measures in the
United States Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice, 28 Y.B. OF EURO. L. 664
(2009).
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for a full judicial review of such implementation measures of UN
sanctions on grounds of fundamental rights granted by the legal
order of the Union. The ECJ emphasized that the European
Union is based on the rule of law inasmuch as neither the
Member States nor its institutions can avoid review of the
conformity of their acts with the treaty understood as “basic
constitutional charter,” which enables the ECJ to review the
legality of acts of the institutions, even if those acts are
undertaken in fulfillment of obligations resulting from
international agreements.33
A. Effective Judicial Protection Against Restrictive Measures
On the basis of that truly fundamental component of the
rule of law, the Court had to further develop the requirements
of judicial control under the circumstances of the war against
terror in the case of ZZ, concerning a decision to refuse entry to
a Union citizen to the United Kingdom on imperative grounds
of public security, which were essentially based on “closed
evidence” and had, in accordance with national law, not been
disclosed to ZZ.34 Under those circumstances, the reference to
the Court focused on the requirements of effective judicial
protection and in particular on whether the essence of the
grounds must be disclosed to the Union citizen concerned by
such a decision. At the outset, the ECJ repeated the settled
caselaw according to which the fundamental right to an effective
legal remedy would be infringed if a judicial decision were
founded on facts and documents which the parties themselves,
or one of them, have not had an opportunity to examine and on
which they have therefore been unable to state their views.35
33. See Kadi and Al Barakaat Int’l Found., [2008] E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 285; Faraj Hassan
v. Council and Chafiq Ayadi v. Council, Joined Cases C-399/06 & C-403/06 P, [2009]
E.C.R. I-11393, ¶ 71; Bank Melli Iran v. Council, Case C-548/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I11381, ¶ 105; Commission and Others v. Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Joined Cases C-584/10
P, C-593/10 P, & C-595/10 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 66–67.
34. See ZZ v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, Case C-300/11, [2013] E.C.R.
I____, ¶¶ 24, 28–32, 40–44.
35. Id. ¶ 53, 56; Josep Peñarroja Fa, Joined Cases C-372/09 & C-373/09, [2011]
E.C.R. I-1785, ¶ 63; Gaydarov v. Director na Glavna direktsia “Ohranitelna politsia” pri
Ministerstvo na vatreshnite raboti, Case C-430/10, [2011] E.C.R. I-11637, ¶ 41. To this
effect, see Union nationale des entraîneurs et cadres techniques professionnels du
football (Unectef) v. Heylens and Others, Case C-222/86, [1987] E.C.R. I-4097, ¶ 15;
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However, the Court noted that it may prove necessary not
to disclose certain information to the person concerned, in
particular in the light of overriding considerations connected
with State security. If, in exceptional cases, reasons of State
security are invoked to refuse full disclosure of grounds which
constitute the basis of a decision taken under the directive
2004/38, the national court must have at its disposal and apply
techniques and rules of procedural law which accommodate, on
the one hand, legitimate State security considerations regarding
the nature and sources of the information taken into account in
the adoption of such a decision and, on the other hand, the
need to ensure sufficient compliance with the person’s
procedural rights, such as the right to be heard and the
adversarial principle.36 In the context of the judicial review
under directive 2004/38 the Member States must lay down rules
enabling the court entrusted with review of the decision’s
legality to examine both all the grounds and the related
evidence on the basis of which the decision was taken. The
national courts with jurisdiction in that matter must carry out an
independent examination of all matters of law and fact relied
upon by the competent national authority and it must
determine whether State security stands in the way of such
disclosure.37 If it turns out that State security in fact does stand
in the way of precise and full disclosure, judicial review has to be
carried out in a procedure which strikes an appropriate balance
between the requirements flowing from State security and the
requirements of the right to effective judicial protection whilst
limiting any interference with the exercise of that right to what
is strictly necessary.38
The Court went on and established an essential distinction
in that field. On the one hand, in order to comply with article
47 of the Charter, the person concerned must be informed, in
any event, of the essence of the grounds on which a decision
Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, Joined
Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, [2008] E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 337; Commission v. Ireland
and Others, Case C-89/08 P, [2009] E.C.R. I-11245, ¶ 52; and Banif Plus Bank Zrt v.
Csaba Csipai & Viktória Csipai, Case C-472/11, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 30.
36. ZZ, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 57; Kadi and Al Barakaat Int’l Found., [2008] E.C.R.
I-6351, ¶ 344.
37. ZZ, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 61–62.
38. Id. ¶ 64.
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refusing entry is based. On the other hand, the weighing up of
the right to effective judicial protection against the necessity to
protect the security of the Member State concerned is not
applicable in the same way to the evidence underlying the
grounds produced before the national courts, since disclosure of
that evidence is liable to compromise State security in a direct
and specific manner and may, in particular, endanger the life,
health, or freedom of persons or reveal the methods of
investigation specifically used by the national security authorities
and seriously impede, or even prevent, future performance of
the tasks of those authorities.39 In such circumstances, the
national court finally has to assess whether the failure to disclose
the evidence is such as to affect the evidential value of the
confidential evidence.40
In the Kadi II judgment, concerning again the
“blacklisting” of individuals under the circumstances of the war
against terror, the Court transposed the essential requirements
developed in ZZ to the freezing of economic resources on the
basis of the inscription in a list drawn up by the Sanction’s
Committee of the United Nations.41 On that basis, the Court
went on to examine the different reasons on which Mr. Kadi had
been listed and concluded whether those were sufficiently
detailed and specific to allow for an effective defense.42 Taking
the comments of Mr. Kadi into account, the Court concluded
that none of the allegations presented against Mr. Kadi in the
summary provided by the Sanctions Committee were such as to
justify the adoption of restrictive measures on the level of the
European Union against him, either because the statement of
reasons was insufficient or because information or evidence
which might have substantiated the reason concerned, was
lacking.43 It should still be noted that the Court is, indeed,
pursuing a balanced approach to the scrutiny of restrictive
measures taken in the context of the fight against terrorism as it
39. Id. ¶ 66.
40. Id. ¶ 67.
41. Commission and Others v. Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C593/10 P & C-595/10 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 100–101 (referencing ZZ, [2013] E.C.R.
I-0000, ¶¶ 51, 53); id. ¶¶ 120, 125–29 (referencing ZZ, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 54, 57,
59, 61–64, 67).
42. Id. ¶¶ 143–49.
43. Id. ¶ 163.
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follows notably from the judgments in Al-Aqsa44 and in Kala
Naft,45 in which the decisions under scrutiny were upheld.
B. Effective Judicial Protection and the Failure to Adjudicate Within a
Reasonable Time
Without neglecting that the above mentioned
jurisprudence is certainly due to a number of circumstances
which are specific to this subject matter, it should still be
underlined that the right to effective judicial protection is the
most important right under the Charter invoked in proceedings
before the Court since the Charter entered into force46 and has
therefore given rise to quite a number of remarkable
jurisprudential evolutions. One of the most interesting
evolutions concerns the enforcement of the right to effective
judicial protection against the failure to adjudicate within a
reasonable time. In its earlier jurisprudence, the Court had been
confronted with the plea and accepted that such a failure
constituted a procedural irregularity. In the case of
Baustahlgewebe v. Commission, the ECJ held that such a failure
could justify a reduction of the amount of a fine imposed by the
Commission in cartel-proceedings against an economic
undertaking.47 In a later case concerning a decision of the
Commission finding that there had been abuse of a dominant
position, the ECJ held that the failure of the General Court to
adjudicate within a reasonable time can give rise to a claim for
damages48.

44. See Stichting Al-Aqsa v. Council, Joined Cases 539/10 P & C-550/10 P, [2012]
E.C.R. I____.
45. See Council v. Mfg. Support & Procurement Kala Naft Co., Tehran, Case
C-348/12 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____.
46. As for the cases closed until February 1, 2014, Article 47 of the Charter has
been invoked, all types of proceedings included, in more than 80 cases before the
Court, see, e.g., ZZ, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 34, 40–69; Pringle v. Ireland, Case
C-370/12, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 28, 178; Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v.
European Parliament and Council, Case C-583/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 30, 93–
125; Mfg. Support & Procurement Kala Naft Co., Tehran, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 65, 66,
68.
47. Baustahlgewebe v. Commission, Case C-185/95 P, [1998] E.C.R. I-8417, ¶ 48.
48. Der Grüne Punkt v. Commission, Case C-385/07 P, [2009] E.C.R. I-6155, ¶
195.
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The Court had to reconsider this jurisprudence in the cases
Gascogne Sack Deutschland,49 Kendrion NV,50 and Group Gascogne
SA51 and came to a quite comprehensive approach. Based on the
settled case law of the Strasburg Court, the ECJ confirmed that a
failure to adjudicate within a reasonable time must, as a
procedural irregularity constituting the breach of a fundamental
right, give rise to an effective remedy.52 It went on explaining
why the failure to adjudicate within a reasonable time can
neither justify to set aside the judgment under appeal nor to
annul the fine imposed by the contested decision.53 On the
question to reduce the fine imposed by the contested decision,
the Court did not continue in the line of its jurisprudence in
Baustahlgewebe v. Commission, but held that a claim for damages
brought against the European Union pursuant to Articles 268
and 340, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (“TFEU”) constitutes an effective remedy of
general application, which has to be brought first to the General
Court, sitting in a different composition from that which heard
the dispute giving rise to the claim for damages and only on
appeal to the ECJ.54 It will be for the General Court to evaluate
the relevant criteria for assessing whether it had observed the
reasonable time principle which the Court had exposed in Der
Grüne Punkt55 as well as the actual existence of the harm alleged
and the causal connection between the harm and the excessive
length of the legal proceedings.56 The final consideration of the
Court on the cases brought before it shows that the ECJ did not
allow for an easy way out, but demonstrated that it is indeed
committed to an effective remedy for asserting and penalizing
the breach of article 47 of the Charter.
49. Gascogne Sack Deutschland v. Commission, Case C-40/12, [2013] E.C.R.
I____.
50. Kendrion NV v. Commission, Case C-50/12 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____.
51. Groupe Gascogne SA v. Commission, Case C-58/12 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____.
52. See Gascogne Sack, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 80 (citing Kudla v. Poland, 2000-XI
Eur. Ct. H.R. § 156–157); Kendrion, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 81 (citing Kudla v. Poland,
2000-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. § 156–157); Groupe Gascogne, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 72 (citing
Kudla v. Poland, 2000-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. § 156–157).
53. See Kendrion, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 82–88.
54. See id. ¶¶ 95, 101.
55. Der Grüne Punkt v Commission, Case C-385/07 P, [2009] E.C.R. I-06155, ¶¶
181, 182, 186; Kendrion, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 96–98.
56. Kendrion, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 99, 101.
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In sum, this jurisprudence contains different messages. The
most evident one is the demonstration that the ECJ’s approach
is, even without formal adherence to the convention, fully
consistent with the settled case-law of the Strasburg Court.
Hereby the ECJ is reinforcing its image as independent guardian
in the field of fundamental rights in which it invariably applies
its standard of review. A second message, addressed to the
General Court, indicates that the failure to adjudicate in a
reasonable period of time is to be taken seriously and will,
beyond the negative public exposure, lead to a further increase
in its workload. And a final message is addressed to the Union’s
political institutions and the Member States to live up to their
common responsibility for the well-functioning of the judicial
institutions of the Union.57
C. Legislative Discretion and Judicial Scrutiny
While the recent jurisprudence of the ECJ on effective
judicial protection is recognizably marked by the impetus which
the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights has
brought about, the recent jurisprudence on the rule of law
relates as well to questions of general nature and, in particular,
to an “eternal” question of any system of constitutional justice:
The interrelation between legislative discretion and judicial
scrutiny and more precisely the way in which the Court operates
its control and how it is respecting the discretion which is
attributed to the legislator in any constitutional democracy.
According to the settled case-law, the Court acknowledges
that in the exercise of the powers conferred on the legislator of
the European Union, it enjoys a broad discretion where its
action involves political, economic, and social choices and where
it is called on to undertake complex assessments and
evaluations. In addition, where it is called on to restructure or
establish a complex system, it is entitled to have recourse to a
step-by-step approach.58 As regards to the judicial review of
57. See, in that respect, the proposition of the Court to increase the number of
judges at the General Court, Council Draft Regulation No. 8787/11 on Amendments to
the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and to Annex I thereto (Apr.
7, 2011).
58. See Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others v Premier ministre,
Ministre de l’Écologie et du Développement durable and Ministre de l’Économie, des
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compliance with constitutional requirements, such as the
principle of proportionality, in the fields in which the European
Union legislature has a broad legislative power, the lawfulness of
a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the
measure is manifestly inappropriate, having regard to the
objective which the competent institutions are seeking to
pursue. However, even where it has such a discretion, the
legislature must base its choice on objective criteria appropriate
to the aim pursued by the legislation, taking into account all the
facts and the technical and scientific data available at the time of
the adoption of the act in question. When exercising its
discretion, the EU legislature must fully take into account all the
interests involved. In examining the burdens associated with
various possible measures, it must be considered that, even if the
importance of the objectives pursued is such as to justify even
substantial negative economic consequences for certain
operators, the exercise of the legislator’s discretion must not
produce results that are manifestly less appropriate than those
produced by other suitable measures.59 Where the European
Union legislature is obliged to assess the future effects of rules
to be adopted and those effects cannot be accurately foreseen,
its assessment is open to criticism only if it appears manifestly
incorrect in the light of the information available to it at the
time of the adoption of the rules in question.60 However,
according to the case-law of the Court, the legislature is obliged,

Finances et de l’Industrie, Case C-127/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-9895, ¶ 57; Int’l Air Transp.
Ass’n v. Dep’t for Transp., Case C-344/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-403, ¶ 80; Rewe-Zentrale v.
Direktor der Landwirtschaftskammer Rheinland, Case 37/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1229, ¶ 20;
Assurances du Crédit v. Council & Commission, Case C-63/89, [1991] E.C.R. I-1799, ¶
11; Germany v. Parliament & Council, Case C-233/94, [1997] E.C.R. I-2405, ¶ 43.
59. Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others, [2008] E.C.R I-9895, ¶¶ 58–59;
Tempelman and van Schaijk v Directeur van de Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en
Vlees, Joined Cases C-96-97/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-1895, ¶ 48; Agrarproduktion Staebelow
v. Landrat des Landkreises Bad Doberan, Case C-504/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-679, ¶ 37;
The Queen v. Minister of Agric., Fisheries and Food and Sec‘y of State for Health, ex
parte: Fedesa and others, Case C-331/88, [1990] E.C.R. I-4023, ¶¶ 15–17; Greece v
Commission, Case C-86/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-10979, ¶ 96.
60. Schaible v. Land Baden-Württemberg, Case C-101/12, [2013] E.C.R. I____,
¶ 50; Agrarproduktion Staebelow v. Landrat des Landkreises Bad Doberan, Case C504/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-679, ¶ 38; Agrana Zucker Agrana Zucker GmbH v.
Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft, Case C309/10, [2011] E.C.R. I-7333, ¶ 45.
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under certain circumstances, to consider the need for a review
of the adopted measures.61
As it appears from this jurisprudence, the ECJ does not
issue a blank check to the EU legislature and operates various
differentiations which allow for a well-balanced approach to this
matter. In the Vodafone case, the Court placed much emphasis
on the impact assessment which the Commission had presented
in relation to the legislative proposal under scrutiny of the
Court62 in order to verify the rationality of the assessments
operated in the legislative procedure. In doing so, the ECJ not
only contributes to the success of the European Union’s
initiative for a “better legislation,”63 but adopts a properly
balanced approach between legislative discretion and judicial
scrutiny.
D. Balancing Fundamental Rights
The recent jurisprudence of the ECJ has not only
demonstrated a reasonable reinforcement of the intensity of its
scrutiny in general, but indicates in particular that the principle
of proportionality has received lately an enhanced attention.64
61. See Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and others, [2008] E.C.R. I-9895, ¶ 62;
Schaible v. Land Baden-Württemberg, Case C-101/12, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 92.
62. Vodafone v. Sec’y of State for Bus., Enter. and Regulatory Reform, Case C58/08, [2010] E.C.R. I-4999, ¶¶ 5, 55, 58, 65.
63. As for the action of the European Commission for improving the quality,
effectiveness and simplicity of EU legislation, see, for example, Commission of the
European Communities, European Governance: A White Paper, COM(2001) 428 final
(July 2001), 20; Commission of the European Communities, Action Plan “Simplifying
and Improving the Regulatory Environment”, COM(2002) 278 final (May 2002);
Communication of 6 June 2002, European Governance: Better Lawmaking,
COM(2002) 275 final; Commission of the European Communities, Communication of,
Updating and Simplifying the Community Acquis, COM(2003) 71 final (Feb. 2003). In
Commission of the European Communities, EU Regulatory Fitness, COM(2012)746
(Dec. 2012), the European Commission committed to strengthening the existing smart
regulation tools (impact assessment, evaluation, stakeholder consultation) and
launched the Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (“REFIT”), aiming at
identifying regulatory burdens, gaps and inefficient or ineffective measures as well as
possibilities for simplification or repeal. Since 1992, the European Commission has
been publishing an annual report on Better Lawmaking, covering also subsidiarity and
proportionality. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Annual Report
2012 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, COM(2013) 566 final (July 2013).
64. See Vodafone, [2010] E.C.R. I-4999; Afton Chem. v Secr’y of State for Transp.,
Case C-343/09, [2010] E.C.R.I-7027; Sky Österreich v Österreichischer Rundfunk, Case
C-283/11, [2013] E.C.R. I____; Schaible v. Land Baden-Württemberg, Case C-101/12,
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According to settled case-law, the principle of proportionality
requires that measures adopted by EU institutions do not
exceed the limits of what is “appropriate and necessary in order
to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in
question; when there is a choice between several appropriate
measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the
disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims
pursued.”65 The Court carefully enhanced the intensity of its
scrutiny in recent judgments with respect to any
disproportionate nature of an obligation imposed on individuals
insofar as it has to verify whether the legislature has met its
obligation to strike a balance between the different interests at
issue66 and, in particular, whether the requirements arising from
those different rights and freedoms have been carried out in
order to reconcile them and to strike a fair balance between
them.67
The balancing exercise which the ECJ carefully undertook
in the Schecke & Eifert case in 2010 concerned the reconciling of
the objective of transparency protected under article 15 TFEU
with the rights to privacy and the protection of personal data
protected under articles 7 and 8 of the Charter and led the
Court to an annulment of the contested regulation with respect
to private individuals since it found that the EU institutions had
not struck the required balance between the interests at stake.68
On the basis of the same balancing test, the Court arrived at the
opposite conclusion in Sky Österreich, in which the ECJ noted
that the EU legislature was required to strike a balance between
the freedom to conduct a business, on the one hand, and the
fundamental freedom of citizens of the European Union to
receive information and the freedom and pluralism of the
[2013] E.C.R. I____; Schecke and Eifert v Land Hessen, Joined Cases C-92-93/09,
[2010] E.C.R. I-11063; Digital Rights Ireland Ltd and Kärntner Landesregierung and
Others, Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, [2014] E.C.R. I____.
65. See Afton Chem., [2010] E.C.R. I-07027, ¶ 45; Sky Österreich, [2013] E.C.R. I____,
¶ 50; Schaible [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 29.
66. See Schecke and Eifert [2010] E.C.R. I-11063, ¶ 77; Sky Österreich [2013] E.C.R.
I____, ¶ 59; Schaible [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 94.
67. See Promusicae v. Telefónica de España SAU, Case C-275/06, [2008] E.C.R. I00271, ¶¶ 65–66; Deutsches Weintor eG v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case C-544/10,
[2012] E.C.R. I-0000, ¶ 47; Sky Österreich, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 60.
68. See Schecke and Eifert, [2010] E.C.R. I-11063, ¶¶ 72, 77, 79, 80; Schaible, [2013]
E.C.R. I____, ¶ 60.
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media, on the other hand.69 In the latter case the Court
concluded that the legislature was entitled to adopt the
contested rule on access to exclusive broadcasting rights for the
purpose of making short news reports which limit the freedom
to conduct a business and to give priority, in the necessary
balancing of the rights and interests at issue, to public access to
information over contractual freedom.70
In Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others,71 the ECJ
only very recently declared the Data Retention Directive
2006/24 to be invalid, holding that the retention of the entire
electronic telephony and internet traffic data of virtually all
users in the European Union is a disproportionate measure for
attaining the objective of public security. The ECJ explicitly
stated that in view of the important role played by the protection
of personal data in the light of the fundamental right to respect
for private life as laid down in articles 7 and 8 of the Charter,
and regarding the extent and seriousness of the interference
caused by the data retention directive, the EU legislature’s
discretion is reduced and judicial review has to be strict.72 The
Court acknowledged that the fight against crime and terrorism
is undisputedly of utmost importance and pointed out that
everybody’s right to security is laid down in article 6 of the
Charter.
However, even such a fundamental objective of general
interest does not, in itself, justify the retention measures such as
established by the directive. On the contrary, the ECJ regarded
the retention measures to be disproportionate, since the
directive does not require any relationship between the data
whose retention was provided for and a threat to public security.
In particular, the directive is not restricted to a retention in
relation (i) to data pertaining to a particular time period and/or
a particular geographical zone and/or to a circle of particular
persons likely to be involved in a serious crime, or (ii) to persons
who could, for other reasons, contribute, by the retention of
their data, to the prevention, detection or prosecution of serious
69. See Sky Österreich,[2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 59.
70. See id. ¶¶ 66–67.
71. See Digital Rights Ireland Ltd and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others,
Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, [2014] E.C.R. I____.
72. Id. ¶ 48.
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offences. Furthermore, the directive does not provide any
exceptions as to the persons concerned, with the result that it
applies even to persons whose communications are subject to
the obligation of professional secrecy.73
In addition, the directive fails to lay down any objective
criterion which could ensure that the competent national
authorities have access to the data and can use them only for the
purposes of prevention, detection or criminal prosecutions
concerning offences that may be considered to be sufficiently
serious to justify such interference.74 Also, the retention period
of a minimum of six months and a maximum of twenty-four
months does not distinguish between categories of data and
their potential usefulness for the purpose of public security and
is not based on objective criteria in order to ensure that it is
limited to what is strictly necessary.75
Moreover, the directive also lacks sufficient safeguards, as
required by article 8 of the Charter, to ensure effective
protection of the data retained against the risk of abuse and any
unlawful access. In this context, the Court added that the
directive did not require the data in question to be retained
within the European Union, with the result that control of
compliance with the requirements of protection and security by
an independent authority, as required by article 8 paragraph 3
of the Charter, was not fully ensured. Such control, carried out
on the basis of EU law, is regarded by the ECJ as an essential
component of the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data.76
It can be concluded from the recent jurisprudence of the
ECJ that the scrutiny of the Court tends to be increased in
situations in which the proper balancing of different
fundamental rights and freedoms or imperative grounds of
public policy are at issue.

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. ¶¶ 57–59.
Id. ¶¶ 60–62.
Id. ¶¶ 63–64.
Id. ¶¶ 66–68.
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E. Distribution of Powers Between the Institutions of the Union
Another important element of the rule of law, directly
relating to the political checks and balances embodied in a
constitutional system, concerns the distinction between the
adoption of rules in matters which only can be enacted in the
legislative process and matters which may be subject to rulemaking on the basis of implementing powers. In that respect,
the adoption of rules essential to a subject matter is, according
to settled case law, reserved to the legislature of the European
Union. Therefore, the essential rules governing the matter in
question must be laid down in the basic legislation and may not
be delegated.77 In a recent judgment on the Schengen Borders
Code and in particular the surveillance of the sea external
borders, the Court held that provisions which, in order to be
adopted, require political choices falling within the
responsibilities of the European Union legislature cannot be
delegated and, furthermore, essential elements of a basic
legislation cannot be amended nor supplemented by new
essential elements enacted on the basis of implementing
powers.78 In that respect, the Court rejected the position taken
by both the Council and the Commission and pointed out that
ascertaining which elements of a matter must be categorized as
essential, is not for the assessment of the European Union
legislature alone, but must be based on objective factors subject
to judicial review.79
After having examined the contested decision in the light
of the empowering-disposition contained in the basic legislation
to take implementing measures, the Court judged that the
adoption of rules on the conferral of enforcement powers on
border guards entails, on one hand, political choices falling
77. See Parliament v. Council, Case C-355/10, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 64
(referencing Deutsche Post and Germany v. Commission, Joined Cases C-463/10 P & C475/10 P, [2011] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 36; Atlanta v. European Cmty., Case C-104/97 P,
[1999] E.C.R. I-6983, ¶ 76; Molkereigenossenschaft Wiedergeltingen eG v.
Hauptzollamt Lindau, Case C-356/97, [2000] E.C.R. I-5461, ¶ 21; Parliament v.
Commission, Case C-156/93, [1995] E.C.R.I-2019, ¶ 18; Parliament v. Council, Case C303/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-2943, ¶ 23; Söhl & Söhlke v. Hauptzollamt Bremen, Case C48/98, [1999] E.C.R. I-7877, ¶ 34; Parliament v. Council, Case C-133/06, [2008]
E.C.R.I-3189, ¶ 45.
78. See Parliament [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 65–66.
79. See id ¶ 67.
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within the responsibilities of the European Union legislature in
so far as it requires the conflicting interests at issue to be
weighed up on the basis of a number of assessments. Depending
on political choices, the powers of border guards may vary
significantly and the adoption of such rules therefore constitutes
a major development in the system of the Schengen Border
Code.80 On the other hand, the Court considered important to
point out that provisions on conferring powers of public
authority on border guards meant that the fundamental rights
of the persons concerned may be interfered with to such an
extent that the involvement of the legislature is required.81
This judgment constitutes not only a major step to the
evolution of a more elaborate system on the delegation of
powers which is specifically addressed in articles 290 and 291
TFEU and currently under examination before the Court.82 It
may very well give a first indication as to how the Court might
interpret the first condition contained in article 52, paragraph 1,
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights requiring that any
limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized
by the Charter “must be provided for by law.” In any event, the
Court has continued to enhance the responsibilities of the
European Parliament, even to the detriment of Council and
Commission. But it has not left out to underline that the crucial
question which elements of a subject-matter must be considered
as essential remains subject to its judicial review.
III. ENSURING THE RESPECT OF THE RULE OF LAW BY
MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The foregoing observations on the recent jurisprudence of
the ECJ relating to the rule of law quite clearly indicate that
ensuring the rule of law offers more than enough challenges to
the Court—even without considering the field of application
which first comes to mind when the rule of law is mentioned in
the context of European Union law and the process of
European legal integration: the observance of the rule of law by
the Member States of the European Union. Taken as such, this
80. See id. ¶ 76.
81. See id. ¶ 77.
82. See Commission v Parliament and Council, Case C-427/12 (pending).
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subject covers the entire question of compliance of Member
States with EU law and, in particular, the requirements resulting
from the obligation to ensure a complete transposition of EU
directives. In that respect, the recent Commission’s 30th Annual
Report on Monitoring the Application of EU law (2012) of
October 22, 2013, gives an overview over the observance of EU
law in general and by each Member State.83
A. Actual Context
In recent years, the observance of the rule of law by
Member States of the European Union has primarily been
discussed in the context of the public perception that the
political evolution in a Member State might be in contradiction
with the values of the Union enshrined in article 2 TEU.84 In the
actual discussion, reference has in particular been made to
Hungary,85 and recently to Romania,86 but studies have shown

83. The Commission reports annually on the national implementation of EU law.
See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, 30th Annual Report on
Monitoring the Application of EU Law 2012, COM(2013) 726 final (Oct. 2013)
(including as Parts I and II, specific reports on the Situation per Member State,
Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2013) 432 final, and the Situation per
Policies, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2013) 433 final); Commission of
the European Communities, 29th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU
Law 2011, COM(2012) 714 final (Oct. 2013) (including specific reports on the
Situation per Member State and the Situation per policies, Commission Staff Working
Documents, SEC(2012) 399 final and SEC(2012) 400).
84. The so-called “Haider Affair” “was giving rise to that discussion.” See, e.g., Per
Cramér & Pål Wrange, The Haider Affair, Law and European Integration, Europarattslig
Tidskrift 2000, 28 et seq.; Gregory Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36
HARVARD INT’L L. J. 1 (1995); WALDEMAR HUMMER & ANTON PELINKA, ÖSTERREICH
UNTER “EU-QUARANTÄNE,”
(2002); Cécile Leconte, The Fragility of the EU as a
“Community of values”: Lessons from the Haider Affair. 28 W. EURO. POL. 620 et seq.
(2005); Lucia Serena Rossi, La “Reazione Commune” degli Stati Membri dell’Unione europea
nel caso Haider, 83 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 151 (2000); HELMUT SCHMITT
VON SYDOW, Liberté, démocracie, droits fondamentaux et Ètat de droit: analyse de l’article 7 du
traité UE, in REVUE DU DROIT DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE 285 (2001).
85. See Caroline Hemler, Europäische Kommission v. Ungarn, V.S.R. EUROPA BLOG
(Oct. 1, 2012), www.vsr-europa.blogspot.com/2012/01/europaische-kommission-vsungarn.html; Manuel Müller, Demokratie in Ungarn: Zeit für eine neue Grundrechtedoktrin
des Europäischen Gerichtshofs?, DER (EUROPÄISCHE) FÖDERALIST (Feb. 22, 2012),
www.foederalist.blogspot.com; Cornelia Ernst, Verfahren nach Artikel 7 E.U.V. gegen
Ungarn einleiten, Die Linke (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.dielinke-europa.eu/article/
7973.verfahren-nach-artikel-7-euv-gegen-ungarn-einleiten.html; see also Press Release,
European Parliament, Hungary Must Abide by EU Values, Say MEPs (July 3, 2013),
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that the situation relating to certain fundamental freedoms
appears troublesome even in well-established Member States.87
Beyond all difficulties to find common ground for an adequate
evaluation of the respective situations and for the acceptance of
the acting institutions, such as the Venice Commission,88 the
context of the legal discussion is framed by the inadequacy of
the procedure foreseen in article 7 TEU which clearly cannot be
considered as an operational or even suitable instrument to
ensure the rule of law in the Member States of the European
Union and the observance of the values enshrined in article 2
TEU.89 Therefore, it seems to be quite generally accepted in
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20130701IPR14768/
html/Hungary-must-abide-by-EU-values-say-MEPs.
86. See Manuel Müller, Was tun für den Rechtsstaat in Rumänien?, DER
(EUROPÄISCHE) FÖDERALIST (July 17, 2012), www.foederalist.blogspot.com; Edward
Kanterian & Cristina Arion, Wie die rumänische Regierung die Verfassung Verbessern will,
(June 14, 2013), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/de/wie-die-rumanische-regierung-dieverfassung-verbessern-will/#.U2epLIFdV8E; Recht im Kontext & Edward Kanterian, The
Crisis of Democracy in Hungary and Romania—Learning from Weimar?, (May 13, 2013),
http://www.verfassungsblog.de/de/the-crisis-of-democracy-in-hungary-and-romanialearning-from-weimar/#.U2epoYFdV8E.
87. Timm Beichelt, Von Steinen und Glashäusern, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG, Dec. 12, 2013, at 7.
88. The Venice-Commission has delivered in total 12 opinions with regard to
Hungary, of which 8 opinions were delivered only in 2012: Opinion 683/2012 on the
Cardinal Acts on the Judiciary that were amended following the adoption of CDLAD(2012)001 sur la Hongrie; Opinion 672/2012 on Act CXII of 2011 on informational
Self-determination and Freedom of Information; Opinion 671/2012 on the Act on the
Rights of Nationalities; Opinion 668/2012 on Act CLXIII of 2011 on the Prosecution
Service and Act CLXIV of 2011 on the Status of the Prosecutor General, Prosecutors
and other Prosecution Employees and the Prosecution Career; Opinion 665/2012 on
Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court; Opinion 664/2012 on Act CCVI of 2011
on the Right to Freedom of Conscience and Religion and the Legal Status of Churches,
Denominations and Religious Communities; Opinion 663/2012 on Act CLXII of 2011
on the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges and Act CLXI of 2011 on the
Organisation and Administration of Courts; Joint Opinion 662/2012 on the Act on the
Elections of Members of Parliament of Hungary. As for Romania, the VeniceCommission has delivered in total 9 opinions, one opinion in 2012: Opinion 685/2012
on the Compatibility with Constitutional Principles and the Rule of Law of Actions
Taken by the Government and the Parliament of Romania in Respect of Other State
Institutions and on the Government Emergency Ordinance on Amendment to the Law
N° 47. The opinions of the Venice-Commission are available at http://
www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/documents/by_opinion.aspx (02.02.2014).
89. See, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy et al., Reverse Solange—Protecting the Essence of
Fundamental Rights against EU Member States, 49 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 489, 491, 496–
507 (2012); SERGIO CARRERA ET AL., THE TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN THE EU. TOWARDS AN EU
COPENHAGEN MECHANISM 6 (2013), available at http://www.ceps.eu/book/rule-law-or-
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academic literature that the procedure in article 7 TEU should
be modified and “sharpened” in order to make it operational.
But since such a modification would require a revision of
the treaty, the discussion has focused on other instruments
which could practically be made available in due course.90 A new
conception of the field of application of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, fundamentally
different from the one embodied in article 51 of this Charter,
has forcefully been argued for.91 In order to make such a
concept workable in practice, a right of the ECJ to certiorari has
been suggested.92 Without going into a profound analysis of the
different aspects which certainly will have to be taken into
consideration when reflecting upon such a proposition, I wish to
limit my remarks to some quite obvious comments. In the first
place, it has to be borne in mind that the European landscape is
far from being homogenous when it comes to the respect for the
rule of law and for fundamental rights by individual Member
States. In such a situation, an extensive reading of article 51 of
the Charter—although possibly welcomed by some Member
States as a European support for the respect of the rule of law
and in particular of fundamental rights—would not only run
counter to the article’s wording and meaning as it results from
the genesis and the general structure of article 51 and 52 of the
Charter,93 but it would also undoubtedly be considered as an
rule-thumb-new-copenhagen-mechanism-eu; Steven Greer & Andrew Williams, Human
Rights and the Council of Europe and the EU. Towards ‘individual’, ‘constitutional’ or
‘institutional’ justice?, 15 EUR. L.J. 462, 474 (2009). For a critique of Art. 7 TEU following
the example of the Iraq War, see Andrew Williams, The indifferent Gesture: Article 7 TEU,
the Fundamental Rights Agency and the UK’s Invasion of Iraq, 31 EUR. L.R. 1 (2006).
90. See von Bogdandy et al., supra note 89, at 508 et seq.
91. For the “reversed Solange” approach, see id. See also András Jakab, Supremacy
of the Eu Charter in National Courts in purely domestic Cases, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Mar. 27,
2013),
http://www.verfassungsblog.de/de/ungarn-was-tun-andras-jakab/#.UvFtA6wt
3bw.
92. See generally Tom Kennedy, First Steps towards a European Certiorari, 18 EUR. L.R.
121 (1993); Petra Jeney, Victim of Its Own Success – the EU Court in Need of Reform, OPEN
SOC’Y FOUNDS. (Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.academia.edu/1078276/Victim_of_Its_
Own_Success_the_EU_Court_in_Need_of_Reform.
93. See Thomas von Danwitz & Katherina Paraschas, A Fresh Start for the Charter:
Fundamental Questions on the Application of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, 35
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1396, 1399 (2012); ALLAN ROSAS, WHEN IS THE EU CHARTER OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS APPLICABLE AT NATIONAL LEVEL? 1269 (2012); Koen Lenaerts,
Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 8 EUR. CONST. L.R. 375
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unjustified “intervention” in those Member States, in which it is
considered as a “sovereign” prerogative of the national
constitutional court to ensure the observance of the rule of law
and the fundamental rights enshrined in the national
constitution. Therefore, such an approach would inevitably lead
to an enhanced institutional controversy between the ECJ and
national constitutional courts and, not to forget, the Strasburg
Court. Despite a number of “invitations” addressed to the Court
in that respect from national courts, the ECJ has so far refrained
from an extensive reading of article 51, as is demonstrated by
quite an impressive number of court orders declining its
jurisdiction.94
(2012); THORSTEN KINGREEN, Ne bis in idem: Zum Gerichtswettbewerb um die
Deutungshoheit über die Grundrechte, in EUROPARECHT 446 (2013).
94. See Savia and Others v Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca
and Others, Case C-287/08, [2008] E.C.R. I-136; Pignataro v Ufficio centrale
circoscrizionale presso il Tribunale di Catania and Others, Case C-535/08 [2009]
E.C.R. I-50; Noël v SCP Brouard Daude and Centre de Gestion et d’Étude AGS IDF
EST, Case C-333/09, [2009] E.C.R. I-205; Hermes Hitel v Nemzeti Földalapkezelő
Szervezet, Case C-16/12, [2012] E.C.R. I____; Cicala v Regione Siciliana, Case C482/10, [2011] E.C.R. I-14139; Attila Vajnai, Case C-328/04, [2005] E.C.R. I-8577;
Polier v. Najar, Case C-361/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-6; Kurt v Bürgermeister der Stadt Wels,
Case C-104/08, [2008] E.C.R. I-97; Asparuhov Estov and Others v. Ministerski savet na
Republika Bulgaria, Case C-339/10, [2010] E.C.R. I-11465; Chartry v. Belgium, Case C457/09, [2011] E.C.R. I-819; Rossius and Collard v. Belgium, Joined Cases 267/10 &
268/10, [2011] E.C.R. I-81; Vino v. Poste Italiane, Case C-161/11, [2011] E.C.R. I-91;
Pagnoul v. État Belge, Case C-314/10, [2011] E.C.R. I-00136; Lebrun and Howet v. État
belge, Case C-538/10, [2011] E.C.R. I-00137; Cozman v. Teatrul Municipal Târgovişte,
Rs. C-462/11, [2011] E.C.R. I-00197; Boncea and Others v. Statul roman, Joined Cases
C-483-84/1, [2011] E.C.R. I-00198; Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor v. Ministerul
Administraţiei şi Internelor (MAI) and Others, Case C-434/11, [2011] E.C.R. I- 00196;
Vinkov v. Nachalnik Administrativno-nakazatelna deynost, Case C-27/11, [2012] E.C.R.
I____; Currà and Others v. Germany, Case C-466/11, [2012] E.C.R. I____; Ministerul
Administraţiei şi Internelor (MAI) and Others v. Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor, Case C134/12, [2012] E.C.R. I____; Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor v. Ministerul Administraţiei
şi Internelor, Inspectoratul General al Poliţiei Române, Inspectoratul de Poliţie al
Judeţului Brașov, Case C-369/12, [2012] E.C.R. I____; Antonella Pedone v. N, Case C498/12, [2013] E.C.R. p. I____; Gentile v Ufficio Finanziario della Direzione Ufficio
Territoriale di Tivoli and Ohters, Case C-499/12, [2013] E.C.R. I____; Ajdini v État
belge, Case C-312/12, [2013] E.C.R. I____; Rivas Montes v. Instituto Municipal de
Deportes de Córdoba (Imdeco), Case C-178/12, [2013] E.C.R. I____; Sindicato dos
Bancários do Norte and Others v. BPN Norte, Case C-128/12, [2013] E.C.R. I____;
Dutka v. Mezőgazdasági és Vidékfejlesztési Hivatal and Csilla Sajtos v. Budapest Főváros
VI. Ker. Önkormányzata, Joined Cases C-614/12 & C-10/13, [2014] E.C.R. I____; Weigl
v. Nemzeti Innovációs Hivatal, Case C-332/13, [2014] E.C.R. I____; Sociedade Agrícola
e Imobiliária da Quinta de S. Paio Lda v Instituto da Segurança Social IP, Case C258/13, [2014] E.C.R. I____; Schuster & Co Ecologic SRL v. Direcţia Generală a
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This prudent policy of institutional self-restraint is not only
motivated by a well-balanced concept of a mutual respect for the
jurisdiction both of national constitutional courts and the basic
objective of the Strasburg system and the preservation of its
integrity, but also reflects in particular a realistic selfunderstanding of the role attributed to the Court by the treaties
of the European Union. Notably, it reflects a keen sense for the
legitimacy of the Court and its limits which even after sixty years
of European integration may still not be compared to the
legitimacy of national supreme or constitutional courts.95 In any
event, an extensive interpretation of article 51 of the Charter
would inevitably lead to a fundamental shift in the multilayered
system of judicial protection between Member States, the
European Union, and the ECJ and the conventional system of
the Strasburg court, which might be perceived as largely
duplicating the Strasburg system and in the end bear the risk of
jeopardizing its very existence, at least for the Member States of
the EU. Insofar as the problem to cure results from a deficient
observance of the rule of law and fundamental rights beyond the
field of application of EU law, given the historic mission of the
Strasburg system it would seem logical to enhance its proper
effectiveness. As understandable as it might be to foster the
respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights by an
application of the instruments resulting from EU law,96 it should
Finanţelor Publice a Judeţului Sibiu– Activitatea de Inspecţie Fiscală, Case C-371/13,
[2014] E.C.R. I____; Sergio Alfonso Lorrai, Case C-224/13, [2014] E.C.R. I____;
Sándor Nagy v. Hajdú-Bihar Megyei Kormányhivatal and Others, Joined Cases C-488–
491/12 & C-526/12, [2014] E.C.R. I____; Cholakova v. Osmo rayonno upravlenie pri
Stolichna direktsia na vatreshnite raboti, Case C-14/13, [2014] E.C.R. I____; Tribunale
di Tivoli, Case C-73/13, [2014] E.C.R. I____ (not yet reported); Francesco Fierro and
Fabiana Marmorale v. Edoardo Ronchi and Cosimo Scocozza, Case C-106/13, [2014]
E.C.R. I____; Claudio Loreti and Others v. Comune di Zagarolo, Case C-555/12, [2014]
E.C.R. I____; Cruciano Siragusa v. Regione Sicilia—Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e
Ambientali di Palermo, Case C-206/13, [2014] E.C.R. I____.
95. Thomas von Danwitz, Verfassungsrechtliche Herausforderungen in der jüngeren
Rechtsprechung des EuGH, EUROPÄISCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFT 253, 253 (2013).
96. For an approach which the Court has firmly rejected so far, see Kamberaj,
Case C-571/10, [2012] E.C.R. I____; Åkerberg Fransson, Case C-617/10, [2013] E.C.R.
I____. See also Clemens Ladenburger, European Union Institutional Report, in Laffranque
(Hrsg.), Reports of the XXV FIDE Congress, 2012, Vol. 1, S. 141 et seq., 183 et seq.;
Clemens Ladenburger, in Tettinger/Stern (Hrsg.), Europäische Grundrechte-Charta,
Art. 52, ¶¶ 80 et seq., in particular ¶¶ 85 et seq. (2006); von Danwitz & Paraschas, supra
note 93, at 1396, 1410; Martin Borowsky, Art. 51, in CHARTA DER GRUNDRECHTE DER
EUROPÄISCHEN UNION ¶ 33 et seq. (Jürgen Meyer ed., 3d ed. 2011); Koen Lenaerts,
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in the end not be forgotten that this cure only can be made
available for EU Member States. Therefore such an approach
would, in the long run, leave “what’s left” to the Strasburg
system and make it increasingly difficult to maintain the
effectiveness and authority of this system which is much more in
need for it than judicial protection in Europe elsewhere.
B. The Role of the ECJ in Ensuring the Respect of Rule of Law by EU
Member States
In recent years as much as in the past, the Court has been
confronted with alleged infringements of EU law by all Member
States, although the number of infringement proceedings
brought before the Court is currently declining.97 The public
debate on the political and constitutional evolution of some
Member States and in particular of Hungary should not lead to
the erroneous conclusion that it is only these Member States
which are at the origin of proceedings relating to an alleged
inobservance of the rule of law. It should rather be born in mind
that even for well-established Member States the record on the
observance of the rule of law is not beyond doubt.98 But, of
course, the Court has recently been confronted with cases
relating to the political and constitutional evolution in Hungary
and has made its contribution to ensure the respect of the rule
of law in this country.

Exploring the limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 8 EUR. CONST. L.R. 375, 399
(2012).
97. According to the Annual Report 2012 of the Court, the number of
infringement proceedings brought before the Court has been constantly declining
from 207 new cases in 2008 to 58 new cases in 2012, see EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE,
ANNUAL REPORT 97 (2012).
98. Beichelt, supra note 87. In 2012, twenty new infringement procedures against
the six founding Member States have been brought to the Court (two against Belgium,
seven against Germany, respectively; five against France and Italy; and respectively one
against the Luxembourg and the Netherlands). See EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE,
ANNUAL REPORT at 97 (2012). In the same period, five judgments have been delivered
against Belgium, four against France, one against Germany, two against Italy, and three
against the Netherlands. See European Commission, 30th Annual Report on
Monitoring the Application of EU Law (2012), COM(2013) 726 final (Oct. 2013), ¶¶
20, 27, 28, 32, 35, 37; see, e.g., Commission v. Belgium, Case C-577/10, [2012] E.C.R.
I____; Commission v. France, Case C-164/11, [2012] E.C.R. I-0000; Commission v.
Germany, Case C-574/10, [2012] E.C.R. I-0000; Commission v. Italy, Case C-565/10,
[2012] E.C.R. I-0000; Commission v. Netherlands, C 542/09, [2012 E.C.R. I-0000.
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1. Impressions of an Ongoing Integration Process
In the first place the Court was confronted with an
application by Hungary to find, in essence, that the Slovak
Republic had failed to fulfill its obligations under EU law in not
allowing Hungarian President Sólyom to access Slovak territory
on August 21, 2009,99 for taking part in a ceremony to
inaugurate a statue of Saint Stephen, the founder and first king
of the Hungarian State. August 21st is considered to be a
sensitive date in Slovakia, since it was on August 21, 1968, that
the armed forces of five Warsaw pact countries, which included
Hungarian troops, invaded the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.
With respect to the obligation resulting from the citizenship of
the Union, the Court held that the right for all Union citizens to
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States
is subject to limitations resulting from international law
applicable to the status of Mr. Sólyom as Hungarian head of
State.100 Since the presence of a Head of State on the territory of
another State imposes an obligation to protection on the latter,
the status of Head of State therefore has a specific character
governed by international law, which is in fact able to justify a
limitation on the exercise of the right of free movement
conferred by article 21 TFEU and directive 2004/38.101 The
Court found as well that the refusal of the Slovak Republic to
allow the President of Hungary access to its territory did not
come under the concept of the abuse of rights as defined in the
case-law of the Court.102 If this case does not reveal important
legal insight, the political incident on which it is based shows to
the contrary quite impressively that the importance of good
neighborly relations and mutual understanding of the delicate
nature of historical events does not constitute an acquis to the
same degree common to all Member States of the European
Union.
A comparable sentiment is raised by a request for a
preliminary ruling referred to the Court from a Hungarian
Court of first Instance concerning, in substance, the question as
99. Hungary v. Slovak Republic, Case C-364/10, [2012] E.C.R. I____.
100. See id. ¶¶ 43–44.
101. See id. ¶¶ 48, 52.
102. See id. ¶¶ 53, 58–60.

2014]

THE RECENT JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECJ

1343

to whether the conditions under which a special tax has been
levied between 2010 and 2012 was constitutive of a disguised
discrimination of foreign-owned undertakings. The Court held
that the application of the steeply progressive scale to a
consolidated tax base consisting of turnover provided for by the
Hungarian legislation would entail indirect discrimination on
the basis of the registered office of the companies, if it was liable
to disadvantage undertakings linked within a group to
companies established in another Member State on the
Hungarian market.103
2. The Recent Constitutional Evolution in Hungary under
Review by the ECJ
The recent constitutional evolution of Hungary has been
subject of two infringement procedures brought by the
European Commission.104 The first one, which concerned a
national scheme requiring compulsory retirement of judges,
prosecutors, and notaries on reaching the age of sixty-two and
spread the flavor of a court-packing plan,105 was decided on the
basis of directive 2000/78 on combating discrimination, inter
alia, on grounds of age. In that respect, the Court categorized
the provisions at issue as instituting a difference of treatment
based directly on age106 and pursued its review on the question
whether this difference in treatment based on age was
objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim and
whether the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and
necessary.107 In its subsequent review of this standard, the Court
generously accepted that both the aim of standardization of
employment relation in the public sector and the aim of
103. See Hervis Sport- és Divatkereskedelmi, Case C-385/12, [2014] E.C.R. I-__,
¶ 45.
104. See Commission v. Hungary, Case C-286/12, [2012] E.C.R. I____;
Commission v. Hungary, Case C-288/12 (pending).
105. See MICHAEL E. PARRISH, THE HUGHES COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND
LEGACY 233–35 (2002); ROBERT G. MCCOLSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 113,
116–19 (Daniel J. Boorstein, ed., Sanford Levinson rev. 5th ed. 2010); Michael Ariens,
A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620 (1994); Richard D. Friedman,
Switching Time and other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional
Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891 (1994).
106. Commission v. Hungary, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 54.
107. Id. ¶ 56.
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attaining a balanced age structure can indeed constitute a
legitimate aim of employment and labor market policy108 and
even acknowledged that the national provisions at issue were an
appropriate means of achieving the aim of standardization
pursued by Hungary.109 But concerning the objective of
establishing a balanced age structure, the Court held that the
measures taken were not appropriate to achieve a truly balanced
age structure in the medium and long terms.110 On the decisive
question of the proportionality of the age discrimination, the
Court held that Hungary failed to provide any evidence to
establish that more lenient provisions would not have made it
possible to achieve the objective at issue111 and concluded that
the provisions at issue were not necessary to achieve the
objective of standardization invoked by Hungary.112
If the rather technical answer given by the ECJ might have
caused some surprise to academic observers who were focusing
on the constitutional and political nature of the measure at
issue, the sober reasoning of the Court, strictly limited to the
technicality of the matter, should be understood as bridging the
gap which Hungary will have to overcome in accepting the
judgment.
The second infringement procedure brought by the
European Commission against Hungary concerns national
provisions by which the six-year term of the data protection
supervisor has been terminated before the end of the term in
conjunction with the creation of a new national authority on
data protection and freedom of information.113 It was brought to
the ECJ on the basis of directive 95/46, which provides for the
creation of an independent authority charged with the
supervision of the national law which Member States have
enacted pursuant to this directive. In essence, it concerns the
question of whether the requirement of independence, which
the Court has highlighted in its settled case-law on that

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. ¶¶ 57–62.
Id. ¶ 64.
Id. ¶ 77.
Id. ¶ 71.
Id. ¶¶ 72–75.
Commission v. Hungary, Case C-288/12 (pending).
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directive,114 is infringed by a national measure bringing the term
of the data protection supervisor to an end prior to the one
foreseen in the mandate. Advocate General Wathelet held on
the basis of the settled case law115 that already the mere risk of
any kind of influence on the decisions of the national authority
on data protection and freedom of information is sufficient for
an infringement of article 28, paragraph 1, second
subparagraph, of the directive.116 On the basis of this standard,
he concluded that the measure in question is in fact contrary to
the obligations resulting from the directive. In its judgment, the
ECJ pointed out that the requirement to set up independent
supervisory authorities on data protection derives from article 8
paragraph 3 of the Charter and article 16 paragraph 2 TFEU
and is thus an essential component of the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.117 The
Court held that the independence requirement covers the
obligation to allow supervisory authorities to serve their full term
of office and to have them vacate office before expiry of the full
term only in accordance with the rules and safeguards
established by the applicable legislation.118 Hungary failed to
fulfil its obligations under directive 95/46 by compelling the
supervisor to vacate office in contravention of the safeguards
established by statute, thereby compromising his independence.
IV. ENSURING THE RULE OF LAW—A NEVER ENDING STORY
The recent jurisprudence of the Court relating to the rule
of law allows for a couple of conclusions which are, of course,
drawn from a judge’s perspective. It should not be surprising
that the challenges which the ECJ has to meet in ensuring the
rule of law in the European Union are, in essence, not much
different from what national judges had and still have to cope
with.
114. Commission v. Germany, Case C-518/07, [2010] E.C.R. I-1885; Commission
v. Austria, Case C-614/10, [2012] E.C.R. I____.
115. Germany, [2010] E.C.R. I-1885, ¶¶ 19, 25, 30, 50 as well as Austria, [2012]
E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 41, 43.
116. Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, Commission v. Hungary, Case C288/12, [2014] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 68 (delivered Dec. 10, 2013) (not yet reported).
117. Commission v. Hungary, Case C-288/12, [2014] E.C.R. I______, ¶ 47.
118. Id. ¶ 55.
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In the first place, this overview has shown in particular that,
even in democratic societies in which the rule of law is
traditionally respected in principle, it is not self-evident that the
rule of law will in fact be observed when legislation has to meet
new challenges. In that respect it should be stressed that the
democratic nature and all public transparency of the political
process are not sufficient to ensure the rule of law. For the
protection of minorities and, in particular, of individuals, a
reasonably intense judicial review both of individual decisions
and legislative acts appears indispensable to effectively ensure
the rule of law. Even in democratic societies it sometimes needs
courage to resist to political and publicly dominating
appreciations when the rule of law is endangered. It is therefore
of crucial importance to monitor the full independence of
judges on all levels. Secondly, the importance of comparative
considerations has increased over recent years and will become
more and more an indispensable condition for legal reasoning
in the multilayered system of judicial protection in Europe.
Today, the authority of our judgments requires that they appear
convincing to judges in all European Member States who are
primarily rooted in a particular national legal tradition and not
familiar with the case-law of the Court. It is therefore a
prerequisite for any further legal integration in Europe that the
Court communicates on the basis of a legal reasoning which is, if
not familiar, at least easily understandable to all its judicial
counterparts. Finally, the rule of law is not a static concept. It
grows and changes its profile with the evolution of society due to
economic, social, technological, and political factors. If we need
the respect for strong traditions in ensuring the rule of law, we
need as well the openness of our minds to properly react to all
new evolutions which endanger the rule of law and, thereby, to
fully live up to the heritage of our founding fathers119: In order
to finally replace the past striving for a domination of Europe by
a rule of law in the European Union common to all its citizens,
it is essential to understand the rule of law as a living
instrument120 which is shaped according to the challenges
ahead.
119. See HALLSTEIN, supra note 2, at 341, 343–44.
120. The living-instrument-doctrine is primarily discussed in relation to the
Strasburg court but formulates a legal reasoning widely shared in continental law
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traditions, see Tyrer v. The United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 4, 15–16 (1978); Soering
v. The United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 8, 40 (1989); Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 7, 26 (1995); Christine Goodwin v. The United Kingdom , 2002-VI Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1, 26. See, in this regard, Luzius Wildhaber, The European Court of Human Rights in
Action, 21 RITSUMEIKAN L. REV. 83, 84 (2004); Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, European
Consensus and the Evolutive Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, 12
GERMAN L. J. 1730, 1731 (2011); Magnus Kilander, Interpreting Regional Human Rights
Treaties, 13 SUR INT’L J. ON HUM. RTS. 145, 152-54 (2010). For the dynamic
interpretation of Union law, see KUTSCHER, THESEN ZU DEN METHODEN DER
AUSLEGUNG DES GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHTS AUS DER SICHT EINES RICHTERS 23, 31 (1976);
ANNA BREDIMAS, METHODS OF INTERPRETATION AND COMMUNITY LAW 33–48 (1978).
For the discussion in comparative constitutional law, see MICHEL FROMONT, JUSTICE
CONSTITUTIONNELLE COMPARÉE 270 (2013). For the discussion in US constitutional
law, see, for example, William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 29
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 401 (2006); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION
(2010); Jack M. Balkin, The Roots of the Living Constitution, 292 B.U. L. REV. 1129 (2012).
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